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Commentary by Ambassadors to the United 
Nations 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶1 Our first panel to respond to the presentation by Lord Hannay is a pane l of 
distinguished diplomats: Ambassador Johan Verbeke, Permanent Representative of 
Belgium to the United Nations; Ambassador Gilbert Laurin, Deputy Permanent 
Representative of Canada to the United Nations; Ambassador Enrique Berruga, the 
Permanent Representative of Mexico, whose flight was canceled, is represented by 
Consul General Carlos Sada Solana; Ambassador Richard Williamson, our United States 
Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Commission and former Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, among many other diplomatic posts in his career. 
JOHAN VERBEKE:* 
¶2 Thank you very much.  Thank you to Northwestern University for allowing me to 
associate myself with this exercise.  Congratulations for having taken this initiative, 
which I think is quite timely and bears on the report which indeed I think is a special 
report.  It is an exceptional document. 
¶3 We have just had the opportunity to listen to what I think was a very 
comprehensive overview of what is in the report by David Hannay. 
¶4 I am not going to go through the report as such but highlight some of the points 
from my point of view, because that is the purpose of our being here together.  Let me 
start by saying again that I personally think this is, indeed, an exceptional document. 
¶5 We have been reading many papers for the last few years and having read that 
document, I have been struck by the very balanced and articulated way in which the 
document is written.  The language also is a very straight language; it is not the kind of 
euphemistic language to which we are accustomed.  It is also not the common journalistic 
language.  It is a very refined language of people who want to communicate and to 
enlighten an audience that is genuinely interested in how this world turns around and can 
even be made better turning around. 
¶6 For me, the document is more than a report, and this is a compliment to Lord David 
Hannay.  It is for me almost a strategic document, a kind of strategic paper as those we 
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know from experience in NATO, for instance, where we had a couple of years ago in the 
context of the Washington summit a forceful strategic concept coming out well-balanced, 
well-thought. 
¶7 We Europeans have our own little strategic concept of September 2003, which is 
the beginning of bringing about a strategic concept for Europe.  It is not the kind of 
forceful document that this is, but it is the beginning of an ambition on behalf of Europe 
to have something in terms of a concept. 
¶8 I do indeed think this is not just a report being made by the High-Level Panel to the 
Secretary-General, this is a strategic report.  I am referring particularly to some of the 
chapters, such as those on which Lord David Hannay has already gone into some detail, 
with respect to the use of force on the one hand and so-called humanitarian intervention 
on the other hand, which is being turned around as being an obligation or responsibility to 
assist. 
¶9 I am sure that if had we had those kinds of elements when we were discussing the 
issue of the Iraq War one and a half years ago, the whole debate would have been carried 
out in a much more rational way.  I am not saying necessarily that we would not have had 
the kind of discussion we have seen, but at least we would have had the terms of 
reference for an enlightened, rational debate. 
¶10 That is the general approach I have to the document. 
¶11 Let me now go into some of the points which I will try to highlight constructively 
and sometimes somewhat more critically. 
¶12 I would like to start by stressing an underlying methodological premise which is in 
the document and which has been implicitly mentioned in the document but which, I 
think, should have been made more explicitly, because the document is a methodological 
starting point in fact making.  This premise is the underlying logic of collective action: 
that a threat to one is a threat to all. 
¶13 This premise also underlies some of the defense coalitions which we know; for 
instance, NATO.  Now, we have in the European Union a new solidarity clause since the 
last summit, so we have already accepted the premise that a threat to one is a threat to 
everybody. 
¶14 But, this point is made in the report for the first time in an explicit way and would 
have benefited, I think, by having been made more explicit. 
¶15 Many states still today have not fully understood that the logic of collective action 
is something other than the logic of parallel individual interactions.  The logic of 
collective action is, indeed, that through true cooperation you can end up in a win-win 
situation; whereas, with parallel individual interactions, you can end up in a zero-sum 
game. 
¶16 And those among you who are familiar with the prisoners’ dilemma know that it, in 
fact, very clearly demonstrates how devastating entities, persons, and states can be by not 
entering into a kind of cooperative collective action. 
¶17 Now, the point is made again that a threat to one is a threat to all, because all these 
threats are interrelated.  There are some good examples of this in the report.  For instance, 
a serious HIV problem in South Africa can be debilitating to the nation states; it can 
enhance international strife which can destabilize the region, which through migration 
can put pressures on Europe or the United States, which can themselves be brought under 
stress. 
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¶18 So, you can make it shorter or you can make it longer, but this is one example 
demonstrating that something which may seem to be a far- fetched threat in another 
continent may, in fact, indirectly affect your own interests. 
¶19 And that point is clearly related to the kind of necessity of entering into the logic of 
collective action which could have been made more forceful. 
¶20 The second point I would like to talk about is the new broad security concept which 
this report is pleading for. 
¶21 It is not the first time that we have broken up our security concept.  You remember 
that twenty years ago, more or less, security was essentially a military matter.  Our 
services and most of the militaries at that time who were dealing with security issues 
were called political-military departments. 
¶22 The concept has been broadened in the past.  For instance, and most prominently in 
the OSCE – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, moreover, the 
purely security and military dimension – the security issue has been broadened and 
broken up with the incorporation of socio-economic dimensions and human security. 
¶23 This report has continued on that track but has done it in a much more convincing 
and forceful way by showing that security is not just a question of the military, but that 
security is also a question of development, extreme poverty, diseases, malnutrition, and 
environmental degradation.  I think that is really the strong point of this report having 
broken up security in the very narrow sense of the word. 
¶24 This being said, we should note that to some extent we are, of course, proceeding 
with what I would call a normative definition of security.  It is not a purely descriptive 
definition.  It is a normative description of security, which is welcome, and which I think 
also serves some political purpose.  By making your security concept that broad, you are, 
of course, giving the floor to both the north and the south: to the north through a 
traditional concept of security, and the south through the enlarged concept in which they 
can more easily recognize themselves in this new effort.  Therefore, let us contribute to 
the implementation of the ideas which we find in this report. 
¶25 As far as the identification of the threats, Lord David Hannay already mentioned 
them.  As regards the identification of the threats, there is one threat which for me is 
mentioned, and which I consider to be a very serious threat today.  The threats which 
have been mentioned, you know, more or less, are international strife, intrastate conflict, 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 
¶26 When I read the report, I must say that I would definitely have added a fifth one, 
which is related to ideas and values.  Ideas and values can kill too, and we see that in 
such dark things as aggressive nationalism, which unfortunately is on the rise in this 
world and particularly in Europe; rejectionist ideologies; anti-Semitism; and 
Islamaphobia. 
¶27 These are fairly new phenomena with which, clearly, today we have to deal.  
Within the OSCE, for instance, within the last twelve months, two conferences have been 
organized for dealing specifically with this kind of problem. 
¶28 The problems that I call aggressive nationalism and rejectionist ideologies are 
related to values and ideas that are not as tangible as terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction.  These values and ideas are intangib les which can, I think, be dangerous and 
can kill as well. 
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¶29 A recent example was the hatred you saw in Rwanda in 1994 when the genocide 
broke out.  This was an investment of a couple of dollars, but the effect, the threat which 
that constituted, has been tremendous.  And recently you have seen that in the recent 
problems in Darfur between north and south where, again, hate speech has taken over. 
¶30 So let us not underestimate – and that is basically the point I wanted to make – let 
us not underestimate that ideas can constitute a threat.  Therefore, they should be fairly 
closely watched in keeping such values as respect for the other high and prominent on the 
agenda. 
¶31 The third topic which I will briefly mention is the chapter on regional 
organizations.  Again, I am not going to repeat what has been said by my neighbor this 
morning, but I personally feel that the potential to be drawn out of the cooperation 
between the UN on the one hand, and the regional organizations on the other hand, could 
have been greater, both in a descriptive way as far as looking to the past, and in a future-
oriented normative way, which is to say I think the Panel should have pushed the point as 
to how regional organizations now, much more than in the past, can affect and contribute 
to international peace and security because that is basically what the report is doing. 
¶32 We have some well-known organizations, collective security organizations or even 
defense organizations, such as NATO.  The European Union, as most of you know, is 
working hard to introduce a foreign and security dimension.  We are working hard now at 
the kind of more prominent security and defense mechanism, and they are picking up 
more and more mandates.  But there are other organizations as well that have done a nice 
job: ECOWAS in Western Africa has a good record of responsible guidance through the 
Nigerians, but now we have the African Union increasingly becoming a significant 
security organization. 
¶33 But we should, as much as we can, support the African Union’s recently set-up 
peace and security commission, which is working well as far as the concepts are 
concerned.  The implementation and capabilities are still lagging behind, but that is 
exactly where we Europeans, you Americans, and all of us, United Nations, should help 
such an organization. 
¶34 So I think the potential coming out of the interaction between the UN and the 
regional organizations is much greater than what is stated in the report. 
¶35 A final remark regarding the institutions, the kind of institutional recommendations 
which have been made.  I think that peacebuilding is a very good idea; we should take 
that up.  We are familiar with the fairly new problem of transition, which is to say that 
you cannot simply state that there was a crisis and you do crisis management.  Rather, 
there is post-crisis humanitarian relief, which is followed by the human reconstruction, 
which is then followed by the political rehabilitation. 
¶36 That kind of slicing around does not make a bit of sense, and in that respect, the 
report again is visionary: it is daring to make the concept of peacebuilding more 
prominent in the report as being a rule which has to do with all the dimensions of a post-
conflict situation. 
¶37 A final, slightly critical remark on the Security Council – I think the criteria as 
Lord David Hannay recalled them this morning are the right ones. 
¶38 I regret, however, that the Panel came out with too many options.  I personally – 
and this is merely a political remark much more than a kind of academic remark – think it 
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would have been better not to have come out with too many options, and the reason for 
that is two-fold. 
¶39 First, if a group of enlightened people who have had the calm and the rest to reflect 
upon the Security Council reform have not succeeded in coming out of the problem and 
therefore have to put on the table two opinions, then I definitely cannot see how a group 
of 191 states would be able to do what the High-Level Panel was not able to do, and this 
fact can be played against us, in terms of people making exactly that point because they 
do not want to proceed with a genuine Security Council. 
¶40 So I think it would have been better to not have said anything as far as models are 
concerned, and to simply have stated the criteria, followed up with either one model or no 
model at all. 
¶41 Well, I will leave it at that, because otherwise I am going to take too much of the 
time, but these were the kind of slightly critical remarks I wanted to make on the overall 
report which I think is a very, very good one.  Thank you. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶42 Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.  Ambassador Gilbert Laurin. 
GILBERT LAURIN:** 
¶43 Thank you, and thank you first to Northwestern and Leuven.  Congratulations and 
thank you for inviting Canada to participate in this meeting. 
¶44 We are a very multilateral country.  We value the UN immensely, and public 
meetings like this, which will create a better understanding of the far-reaching proposals 
that are in the Panel’s report, we consider very important. 
¶45 We would cross the United States from one corner to the other to be given an 
opportunity to participate with future decision-makers in order to advance the very 
excellent recommendations that are in this Panel’s report. 
¶46 Let me just add my recommendation to that of Ambassador Verbeke about reading 
the report.  Those of who you have not read it, and many have not simply because you 
have read other UN documents and you know how they can be turgid and difficult to 
fathom, be assured that this is not the case. 
¶47 Sir David’s eloquence this morning can be found in this document.  You will find it 
as easy to read as you did to listen to him explain the questions relating to the use of 
force. 
¶48 What I would like to do this morning rather than deal specifically with the details 
of the report’s recommendations (though I will deal with some of them on the use of 
force), is to talk a little bit about what happens now. 
 
 ** Ambassador Gilbert Laurin is Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations.  He 
has served in that capacity since August 2002.  Ambassador Laurin joined the Canadian foreign service in 
1980 and served abroad in Marseille, Paris, Damascus and Rome. In Ottawa, he served with the Human 
Rights Division, the Senior Personnel Division, the Senior Appointments Secretariat at the Privy Council 
Office, and between 1994 and 1997 as Deputy Director of the Legal Operations Division. In 2001, he 
became Minister-Counsellor with the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in New York.  
Ambassador Laurin received a B.A. (Honours) from the University of Manitoba in 1967, and a L.L.B. from 
Osgoode Hall Law School in 1975. 
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¶49 Sir David said that – I think his words were “no blue-sky thinking.”  For instance, 
the report did not talk about abolishing the veto because it simply is not going to happen, 
so why bother.  “They will not fly,” he said. 
¶50 Well, the United Nations is the resting ground of hundreds of incredibly good 
ideas, and the reason for that is very simple.  There are 191 countries in the United 
Nations.  They do not all have the same objectives, and their first objective is very rarely 
what is good for the institution.  That should come as no surprise.  We would be naive to 
think otherwise. 
¶51 Countries look at what is in their national interests, and it is all very well to say that 
what is in the international community’s interest is ultimately in their national interest, 
but unfortunately most countries have a shorter vision, a shorter time frame, and so they 
look at what is specifically in their immediate interest. 
¶52 And so getting this report or getting the recommendations of this report adopted is 
a colossal job that will fall to my government, to the governments of those around this 
table, and to the diplomats in New York who will attempt to forge what is called the 
outcome document of the 2005 summit. 
¶53 A key part of that process will involve the High-Level Panel Report.  It will involve 
the Sachs report on the millennium development goals,1 and it will involve an assessment 
of the Secretary-General’s report, which will come out in March and will, in effect, 
launch the negotiations. 
¶54 At this stage, we are discussing, statements are being made, and we are exploring 
one another’s points of view.  But after the Secretary-General presents his report in 
March, we will actually start trying to nego tiate an agreement on reform.  And it is not 
going to be a very pretty sight.  It never is, because the kind of horse-trading that will 
occur will involve bargains of apples and oranges, things that are totally unrelated. 
¶55 “If you give me this, I will agree to that.”  There is no connection between these 
things.  But at the end of the day, it will be the willingness to look at a global picture, not 
simply threats to peace and security that will produce an agreement. 
¶56 One of the great challenges that those who will negotiate this outcome document 
will face is that for many developing countries, the report is acutely short on how to 
address development notwithstanding the enormous leap that the report makes in linking 
development to security. 
¶57 From my perspective, that would be a very positive leap, but I know that from the 
perspective of a number of developing countries, this is seen as making the statement that 
development is a subset of security.  In other words, we have got to talk about 
development because our first priority, “security,” will only be addressed if we agree to 
talk about development. 
¶58 Well, for developing countries that is not good enough.  Development is an 
objective in itself, not a subset of security.  In fact, the very title of this conference would 
probably rankle some of my colleagues. 
¶59 They would say reforming of the UN as it is examined in the High-Level Panel 
Report is limited to the Security Council.  There are only fifteen out of 191 countries on 
 
1 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT , INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT : A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005), available at 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm. 
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the Security Council.  There are five who have a veto and that makes them have more 
votes than all the others put together, so it is not a very representative institution. 
¶60 And so if reforming the UN is seen as involving the use of force, then we are 
talking about the Security Council, and indeed representatives from many developing 
countries have pointed out that what the report does is to add to the power of the Security 
Council by defining threats very broadly and essentially passing the authority to deal with 
those threats to the Security Counc il. 
¶61 Many countries who value the General Assembly as the only truly representative 
body in the United Nations (the Economic and Social Council only having fifty-three 
members) believe that any time the responsibility for an issue is passed to the Security 
Council, it diminishes the authority of the General Assembly.  That is the perception. 
¶62 When you talk about health being a threat to peace and security as it surely is, the 
report is undoubtedly correct on that.  Well, if it is a threat to peace and security, and the 
Security Council is the body responsible for peace and security, well, then you are really 
transferring what the majority of members of the UN would have seen as the prerogative 
of the General Assembly to the Security Council. 
¶63 When you propose the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, an imminently 
useful organization from the perspective of Canada, the immediate analysis by a majority 
of the members of the General Assembly is that a Peacebuilding Commission which 
deals with situations before you have a conflict and after the conflict has ended should be 
under the Economic and Social Council, which already has commissions and bodies that 
deal with post-conflict situations: for example, for Burundi and Haiti. 
¶64 And if you are going to deal with measures involving development and creating 
stability, should not that also be the responsibility of the General Assembly – or of the 
Economic and Social Council? 
¶65 That is, to achieve success on some of the Panel’s recommendations will require 
that member states be persuaded that it is in their immediate interest – not only in their 
long-term interest, but in their immediate interest - to adopt some of these 
recommendations.  One of the ways that will occur is because concessions will be made 
elsewhere because what I told you a few moments ago is that in this unseemly process of 
negotiations, there will not always be a link between one item and the other.  But, at the 
end of the day there will be compromise in one place based on the understanding that 
there will be compromise in an unrelated place. 
¶66 Individual countries will work very hard for certain things.  I can tell you now that 
in terms of security and the use of force, we will expend an enormous amount of energy 
and political capital to try to advance the concept of the responsibility to protect. 
¶67 It is one that we think is indispensable in order to achieve real peace and security in 
the world.  This is particularly so as most threats are internal today, intrastate as opposed 
to interstate. 
¶68 Many states are very uncomfortable with the concept of the responsibility to 
protect, and they will only accept it if there is agreement elsewhere in areas with which 
we may not be entirely comfortable or prepared to go financially, such as in some 
development-side issues. 
¶69 But, that is the sort of bargain that we will have to live with if we are to achieve the 
implementation of the most important recommendations in this report, bearing in mind 
that a very significant number of the recommendations do not need intergovernmental 
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approval in order to be achieved.  Some of them can be dealt with directly by the United 
Nations.  Others can be dealt with directly by the member states. 
¶70 If I can just finish on one note, and that is to say that this is a grand bargain (and 
that is the word that is used these days). 
¶71 Certain areas that are not covered very thoroughly by the report for perfectly sound 
reasons, such as the reform of the General Assembly or ECOSOC, two important charter 
institutions, or even reform of the Commission on Human Rights, or the question of the 
protection of civilians, gender issues and human rights at large, children, all of these 
issues will have to be brought into the final grand bargain because if in September 2005 
the leaders of the international community adopt an outcome document which makes no 
reference to women or children or human rights, the message that will have been sent is 
that the international community does not consider these issues to be of fundamental 
importance, certainly not on par with development or security. 
¶72 We know development will be there.  There are a majority of states that will ensure 
that.  We know that security and the response to security threats will be there because that 
is in this report, and it is also being driven by a number of countries, but it will be up to 
us to introduce these missing items in the outcome document if it is truly to reflect the 
priorities that we believe that this world should have.  Thank you. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶73 Thank you very much, Ambassador Laurin.  Consul General Sada Solana of 
Mexico. 
CARLOS MANUEL SADA SOLANA: 
¶74 Well, as has been said by Douglass Cassel, Ambassador Enrique Berruga Filloy 
could not make it due to the weather conditions, but he sent me his remarks so I am going 
to read them even though I am more in the bilateral world rather than the multilateral as 
in the United Nations so I will speak to this text. 
¶75 It says, distinguished guests and participants: I want to thank Northwestern 
University for its kind invitation to talk about the present state and likely future of the 
United Nations and the multilateral system.  As you may know by now, I was unable to 
fly to Chicago because of the snowstorm. 
¶76 This leads to me to think that next time we should meet in Mexico where the 
closest thing to snow we have is the ice cream parlor.  So there you have it: an open 
invitation to organize a seminar like this in Mexico for the two universities, Leuven and 
Northwestern University. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶77 We accept.  January only. 
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CARLOS MANUEL SADA SOLANA: 
¶78 Okay.  So besides the more pleasant conditions in Mexico, you will find a keen 
interest in multilateral affairs and a considerable concern about the future of the United 
Nations. 
¶79 In September 2003, Vicente Fox spoke before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, and as usual, he held a number of bilateral meetings with foreign dignitaries.  
But what was unusual about that occasion is he had thirty-eight such bilateral encounters, 
partly because Mexico was at the time holding an elected seat on the Security Council 
and partly because experience has shown Mexico that our collective security system was 
passing through a particularly destined time. 
¶80 On those bilateral meetings that I myself attended with Ambassador Berruga, it was 
most revealing that all presidents and prime ministers he met with spoke about the 
unfolding situation in Iraq and, of course, about the sense of crisis the United Nations 
was passing through. 
¶81 As a result of those talks, it became apparent that this sense of crisis in the 
multilateral system was widespread and that a major effort needed to be done in order to 
revamp it and put it back to date. 
¶82 As a consequence, President Fox invited fourteen leaders of the world, who had 
shown deep concern and enthusiasm, to join him in an effort to reform the United 
Nations. 
¶83 It was then that a Group of Friends for United Nations Reform2 was established, 
taking into account the initiative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to gather a group of 
distinguished diplomats and experts to produce a report on threats, challenges, and 
change.  The Group of Friends became instrumental at the level to bring about and 
implement, when possible, the recommendations from the Panel of which Lord Hannay is 
a noted member. 
¶84 One of the lessons learned from this political exercise is that most governments and 
societies believe that the multilateral system is undergoing a deep crisis.  However, it is 
also true that very few of them could agree on why it is in crisis.  Some complain that it 
does very little to address the relevant issues.  Others say it is too slow and inefficient in 
meeting security challenges, and yet others say that they do enough to help human rights 
situations, just to name a few. 
¶85 Perhaps one of the underlying problems is that we all expect too much and 
something different from the United Nations, and that, in turn, also becomes a sign of 
crisis.  To simplify the argument, it seems as if all countries expect that the United 
Nations is able or should be able to solve all of the world’s problems, from gender 
equality to international rivalries, and from arms control to overseeing the development 
of aid – everything. 
¶86 The report of the High-Level Panel and its 101 recommendations is a sign that the 
crisis is real and that something – major surgery – is promptly needed.  The Panel 
members show their wisdom by placing no threat above any other in the hierarchy; 
indeed, our normalized world cannot afford to focus solely on international terrorism 
 
2 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission on Human Rights, 61st Sess. 4th mtg. at ¶ 55, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/SR.4 (Aug. 26, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 90th plen. mtg. at 9, 12, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/PV.90 (Apr. 8, 2005). 
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without addressing the issues of poverty and marginalization.  Our collective system 
cannot deliver adequate results by merely pointing out environmental disasters but being 
oblivious to the problems that may cause them. 
¶87 For all these reasons, the momentum to reform to the United Nations is 
unparalleled.  This is not as it used to be.  As you all know, efforts for reform were made 
on the fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries of the United Nations, but there was not a 
pressing and obvious need for change as it is perceived now. 
¶88 One of the main political problems we face today is that the United Nations is 
called to meet challenges for which it was not even designed.  In 1945, in San Francisco, 
as was mentioned by Lord Hannay, its main tasks were to bring interstate wars to an end 
and to bring about economic and social development.  Under that score, the United 
Nations has been rather successful.  Classical international wars are, by and large, a 
figure of the past.  As the Panel points out, more civil wars have been brought to an end 
by diplomatic means in the last fifteen years than in the previous two centuries.  
Diplomacy and the United Nations as such cannot be overlooked or underestimated as a 
true and effective means for peace. 
¶89 However, the problems confronted by the international community nowadays are of 
a nature not faced by the United Nations’ founding members.  The most salient threats we 
face today were not at the forefront of the world’s concern in 1945.  The so-called non-
passport issues, such as international terrorism, organized crime, failing states, 
environmental degradation, invent ion of weapons of mass destruction, and widely spread 
contagious disease, are more of a real and present danger than an interstate war.  A new 
world, or rather a new, safer place, demands an altogether different global security 
system. 
¶90 Part of the crisis is in explaining the tools, or lack thereof, that the international 
community has in its hands to tackle these very dangerous issues.  Therefore, a new tool 
box is needed in order to effectively deal with these kinds of threats. 
¶91 The year 2005 should be the year of reform of the United Nations.  The new tool 
box should come in the form of an addendum, an additional protocol to the United 
Nations Charter, that enables the international community to deal effectively with the 
new threats and to view the kind of cooperation that is needed for states to deal with 
them.  It is no longer sufficient to rely on the Charter, but rather we must expand the 
capabilities of the multilateral system to face the new challenges. 
¶92 It is with these concerns in mind that Mexico established the Group of Friends for 
United Nations Reform.  You may recommend your conversation over San Francisco’s 
second conference to review the working and capabilities to reshape the United Nations 
in line with the needs of the mother world. 
¶93 Regardless of how powerful or weak a state might be, we should be all mindful that 
lacking an effective political security system is a major threat in itself.  It is impossible to 
tackle robbery or any other type of crime without a proper police force.  Likewise, in the 
international scene, it is impossible to effectively deal with common threats in the 
absence of a strong national security system. 
¶94 In this sense, one of the most obvious – and not at all a failure of the way the 
collective system works – is that these resolutions and recommendations are increasingly 
complied with.  The most dramatic change was the resolution of the General Assembly, a 
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far cry from changing the course of events, but it is also increasingly the case in the 
Security Council. 
¶95 Iraq was a clear case in point throughout a decade of sanctions and lack of 
compliance.  This is indeed a sign of the multilateral system in crisis, which we need to 
swiftly address.  The very nature of the system, the collective decision-making, is at risk. 
¶96 The levels of grandeur posed by the new threats and the lack of compliance with 
resolutions call for a comprehensive review of the United Nations, the members’ 
commitment and interest, and the need to bring about reform so that the United Nations is 
in tune with the rest of today’s world. 
¶97 It is quite clear that our society cannot afford to stay the course; there is too much 
at stake.  It would be of historic irresponsibility to remain idle in the face of such major 
challenges or to accept that the unilateral system is too heavy and full of inertia that we 
cannot bring about this necessary transformation. 
¶98 In Mexico’s view, the one issue that draws the most attention, the enlargement of 
the Security Council membership, is nowhere near the target.  Certainly, it is not part of 
the big decisions and answers that are needed; it would be wonderful that it were as easy 
as that.  Most recently, this discussion has prompted a new set of problems as rivalries to 
take new permanence increase, as nationalists tend to take again a much higher profile, 
and as a decisive number of countries feels that they are in line for the decision-making 
process. 
¶99 It is indeed a contradiction in terms to realize that, in the very moment that the 
world needs the commitment of as many countries as the challenges we face require, it is 
hopeless to try to narrow the scope of international participation of our collective efforts. 
¶100 In the very same way that it requires a high level comprehensive approach to spell 
out the recommendations, the member states need to be mindful that only collective effort 
can render the results we all expect from the multilateral system.  To tackle issues, such 
as international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, demands a joint and 
concerted effort, a rules-based system, and a multilateral effort that clearly enhances 
everyone’s national interest. 
¶101 The year 2005 can provide as tremendous an historic opportunity as 1945 was in its 
time to overhaul the international system and to produce the collective method that 
enables us to deal with the major worries of our time. 
¶102 It is about time to launch a San Francisco II conference to come to grips with our 
modern predicament.  Thank you very much. 
DOUGLASS CASSEL: 
¶103 Thank you very much, Mr. Consul General, on behalf of Ambassador Berruga.  
Ambassador Williamson from the United States. 




¶104 I thank Professor Doug Cassel for organizing this conference.  The United Nations 
is very important and valuable to the world and also very valuable to the United States 
Government. 
¶105 I have seen it in action, from the UN giving inoculations in El Salvador to the 1998 
Cambodian elections which would not have taken place without the UN’s significant 
role, the coordination of international aid to East Timor, visiting refugee camps in 
Ethiopia, meeting with some of the victims of abuse in Sierra Leone who have looked to 
the special court of which the UN is a part to help in transitional justice, and last fall 
when I led an international monitoring team in the Afghan elections where the UN did 
truly a remarkable job. 
¶106 Furthermore, I would say that it is important to have rules of the road for the United 
States, because predictability is important for us as well as for other countries.  In that, 
the United Nations can play a valuable role. 
¶107 I applaud Secretary-General Kofi Annan for commissioning the High-Level Panel 
Report, and we are indebted to those who served on the Panel, such as Sir David Hannay, 
Brent Scowcroft and others.  They have seriously addressed important issues and have 
made interesting recommendations. 
¶108 I am speaking in my own personal capacity, and I will say that I agree with some of 
those recommendations and with others, I do not agree. 
¶109 Elsewhere, in more depth during these two days, the preventive use of force and the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention will be addressed, so I will just touch on them 
briefly. 
¶110 On the use of force: in recent years, the suggestion has developed that the UN 
Security Council might have a monopoly on legitimacy.  I have a hard time embracing 
this suggestion.  As Sir Hannay mentioned, there were many conflicts during the long 
Cold War in which the Security Council did not sanction use of force.  There were 220-
plus wars during that time.  Since the end of the Cold War, most dramatically in both 
Kosovo and Iraq, the Security Council has not sanctioned the use of force.  It is hard to 
argue that the use of force to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was not legitimate, 
based on our values and on the fact that people on the ground were suffering. 
¶111 At the same time, there is a natural tension between the powerful and the less 
powerful.  In the nineteenth century, the United States was less powerful and wanted 
more rigid and acceptable rules to govern the sea lanes.  Britain and France were more 
powerful, and they resisted such rule-making.  Where this tension arises depends on 
where you sit, and I think the High-Level Panel Report will contribute greatly as a 
platform to explore these tensions. 
 
 *** Ambassador Richard S. Williamson is currently the United States Representative to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and was most recently the Alternate Representative of the US to the UN for 
Special Political Affairs.  Ambassador Williamson is a partner in the Chicago office of the international law 
firm of Mayer, Brown, Rowe, and Maw.  His foreign policy experience includes service as Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organizations from 1988 to 1989, US Ambassador representing the US 
at the UN Office in Vienna, Austria, from 1983 to 1985, and delegate to the UN Human Rights 
Commission in 1987, 1988 and 1989.  Ambassador Williamson has been a board member of the UN 
Association - USA, the International Republican Institute and the Foreign Policy Research Institute.  He 
has authored five books and over 100 articles for a variety of periodicals. Ambassador Williamson is a 
graduate of Princeton University and the University of Virginia Law School. 
Vol. 4:1] Commentary by Ambassadors to the United Nations 
37 
¶112 It is important to note that Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Truman both 
invested greatly in the birth of the UN, in particular FDR.  Even though the world had 
undergone a terrible war with atrocities in the Holocaust, FDR had faith in collective 
security, because during that war the great powers, however painfully and awkwardly, 
had been able to agree, driven by a common enemy.  It is also worth noting that Stalin 
agreed to support the launch of the UN based on his belief that it would help protect the 
status quo and the Soviet Union’s position, in particular. 
¶113 Without the same type of external identifiable threat that existed during World War 
II, collective security is a much more difficult endeavor, but it is worth the effort. 
¶114 I think the High-Level Panel made a very helpful contribution by providing a 
definition of terrorism.  The Panel defined terrorism as any action intended to cause death 
or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, and the purpose of such action, by 
its nature or its context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or 
international organization to perform any act or to abstain from performing any act.  This 
is very useful and very helpful, and it is something we have not yet been able to do in the 
counterterrorism committee in New York or other UN venues.  Hopefully, this definition 
will stimulate further muscular activity by the counterterrorism committee in the UN. 
¶115 Furthermore, under the Panel’s discussion of terrorism, its makes a useful statement 
that “there’s nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and the killing of 
civilians.”3  The double standard on Israel in the General Assembly, the Security Council, 
the Human Rights Commission, and other UN organs is among the most harmful 
practices that undercut the legitimacy of the United Nations. 
¶116 I think the report is properly critical of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
which has a well-earned credibility deficit with members such as Sudan, Cuba, and 
Libya, as well as with its inability last spring to pass a meaningful resolution on the 
genocide in Darfur.  Countries subject to UNCHR resolutions should not be allowed to 
serve, and the whole issue of democracy caucus in the Human Rights Commission and 
elsewhere is one that should be explored and, from our point of view, should be 
developed. 
¶117 The report also properly identifies the need to strengthen counterterrorism regimes, 
especially nuclear proliferation.  But at the same time, the UN Security Council has been 
unable to deal with North Korea since it was referred to the UN two years ago, because 
one of the permanent members does not want it to be brought to the Security Council. 
¶118 Finally, let me just briefly address the question of the Security Council itself.  
During the discussion of an eighteenth Iraqi resolution, the Singapore Ambassador told 
me of his concern that the disconnect between power in the real world and the power 
distribution in the UN Security Council was great and getting greater, and he worried that 
it would undercut the effective reach of the legitimacy of the Security Council.  He 
explained that this was because the Security Council was so valuable for a country like 
Singapore, which otherwise does not have a voice at the table on many security issues. 
¶119 Regarding the membership of the Security Council, both proposed formulas – 
whether you add six new permanent members and three new two-year term members or 
create a new tier of eight semi-permanent members chosen for renewable four-year terms 
plus one additional two-year term to the existing ten – both proposed formulas are 
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interesting.  However, I am not sure they deal with the fundamental problems of the 
Council. 
¶120 First, I do no think that the problem is the numbers but rather how the Security 
Council operates.  I am concerned that any expansion will just increase and heighten the 
two-tiered dynamics already existent within the Security Council.  Secretary-General St. 
Clair was the first to suggest that the P54 meet and deliberate on their own regarding 
some important security issues.  These separate discussions flourished during the 
deliberations on the First Gulf War, and they still occur with regard to matters of direct 
importance to any of the P5. 
¶121 I fear that if the Council is expanded, it will become even more unwieldy and even 
more subject to lengthy speeches as opposed to real discussions.  The two-tiered nature of 
the Security Council will become even more dramatic, as the P5 will deal with more and 
more issues in separate deliberations before bringing them to the attention of the 
Council’s nonpermanent members. 
¶122 Also, increasing the size of the Security Council will change how countries behave.  
I would like to relate two interesting things I realized during the deliberations of an 
eighteenth Iraq resolution.  The first occurred when one of the elected members on the 
run-up talked to me outside the Security Council chamber after one of our debates.  I 
went through the various arguments, reviewing what was included in Resolution 1441 
and how significant components had not been complied with, and therefore we had 
already voted on the need for serious consequences. 
¶123 What he said to me was very revelatory and reflected not only his country’s views 
but others.  He said, “Rich, you ask too much.  We ran for the Security Council to be 
important and to have a voice.  We did not run to make decisions on war and peace.  
That’s your problem.” 
¶124 More publicly, during Security Council deliberations, the Chilean Ambassador 
attacked the P5 a number of times for not achieving consensus.  He did not attack them 
for not getting consensus for war or for not getting consensus against war; he just 
attacked them for not reaching consensus, because it was their responsibility to do so. 
¶125 Now, I am not saying that these two elected members represent all nonpermanent 
members of the UN.  They certainly do not, but they do represent at least a component 
constituency.  And they raise important questions on the ability for unipolar action and on 
collective security versus coalitions of the willing.  More fundamentally, at this time of 
the US’s significant strength, should the Security Council be trying to restrain US power 
or embrace a directive?  This is an issue which the P5 especially needs to address. 
¶126 In closing, let me repeat that I think the High-Level Panel did important work, 
raised important issues, and made a number of very good recommendations.  They have 
stimulated thought regarding some reforms.  Hopefully, the 191 members of the UN will 
be able to reach some form of consensus to adopt some of these reforms, because we will 
all benefit if we have a more effective UN. 
¶127 Thank you. 
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